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RECENT CASE
Securities-10b-5-SCIENTER Is REQUIRED IN A PRIVATE ACTION UNDER
RULE 10b-5-Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S.Ct. 1375 (1976)
In the last few years professionals have been the target of numerous
suits brought by the public. Courts have shown a willingness to hold
doctors, lawyers, accountants, and other professionals liable for their
torts, including negligence. However, the Supreme Court has chosen to
throw a protective cloak over professionals involved with the securities
industry in their recent decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder.' The
suit was based on a negligence theory of liability brought under Section
10(b)2 and Rule 10b-53 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The
Supreme Court held that the basis of liability in a private action for
damages under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 is limited to intentional
wrongdoing.' This Note will discuss the development of the liability
1. 96 S.Ct. 1375 (1976).
2. 15 U.S.C. §78j (1970), which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or, of any
facility of any national securities exchange...
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
3. 17 C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1975) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security.
4. 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1391 (1976). The Supreme Court did not discuss whether there should
be a varying standard of liability depending upon whether the defendant was a partici-
pant, conspirator, or aider-abettor. The issue was resolved without discussion, however,
since the Court made it clear that a single standard of liability, intentional conduct, would
be applied in all cases.
Previously, there were few cases on the liability of aiders-abettor:3, but courts and
commentators seemed to agree that aiding and abetting in civil suits should require an
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controversy, the Hochfelder case, and the ramifications of that decision.
The right of private action under Rule 10b-5 was recognized early by
the courts and the SEC. ' However, neither Congress nor the SEC, pro-
vided guidelines to determine the limits of liability. Consequently, a
much debated issue has been the role of scienter in determining liability
and whether the element required "intent" or merely "knowledge.",
affirmative act of assistance or concealment, while mere failure to report or disclose
should not give rise to liability. See Isbell, An Overview of Accountants' Duties and
Liabilities under Federal Securities Laws and a Closer Look at Whistle-Blowing, 35 OHIO
ST. L.J. 261 (1974); Ruder, Multiple Defendants In Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding
and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA.
L. REv. 597, 638 (1972).
5. 2 A. BROMBERC, SECURITIES LAWS FRAUD, SEC RULE lob-5, §2.2 (420) at 22.7
Ihereinafter cited as BROMBERG].
6. A SEC commissioner recently rejected the idea that the SEC should set up guidelines
or standards of liability:
The genius and strength of Rule 10b-5 has been its hospitality to new concepts,
new thinking, and new development, and its ability to be, in effect, a spokesman
for the developing standards in society. Rules limiting the broad standards
contained in Rule 10b-5 could have a stunting effect upon the development of
the law and remove the most formidable means that society now has to assure
that corporate law meets its expectations ....
The diversity of our society and its business relationship is too rich, too varied,
too complex to submit wholly to specifics.
Sommer, Professional Responsibility: How Did We Get Here? 30 Bus. LAW. 95, 101-02
(1975).
7. According to Professor Bromberg, a definition of scienter which would be acceptable
to all circuits has not yet been found, although a consensus has been reached on most of
the other elements, such as standing, reliance, privity, and materiality. Bromberg, Are
There Limits to Rule lOb-5?, 29 Bus. LAW. 167 (1974). The common law definition of
scienter, "intent to deceive, to mislead, to convey a false impression," set forth in W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 715 (4th ed. 1971), was rejected by all the courts
until the Supreme Court's recent holding. See notes 30-34 and accompanying text infra.
One commentator stated:
While all courts have rejected the strict common law definition of scienter, they
have differed in their interpretation of the precise state of mind requirement for
liability. Some courts have held negligence sufficient, while others have required
more than negligent conduct.
Comment, Development of a Flexible Duty Standard of Liability Under SEC Rule lOb-5,
32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99, 101 (1975). In another analysis of the subject the author took
a firmer stance:
IS/cienter should be interpreted to mean knowledge of the facts, either actual
or constructive. The latter is found when a defendant's lack of knowledge is the
result of conduct sufficiently careless that knowledge will be attributed. Al-
though a court in such a case may not be convinced that the defendant did
actually know the facts, his lack of knowledge is inexcusable. Negligence, in
contrast, refers to conduct not wholly innocent but not so careless as to be
inexcusable.
Comment, Scienter and Rule 1Ob-5, 67 Nw. U.L. REV. 562, 570 (1972).
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Courts first employed various common law principles of misrepresen-
tation to assist them. In the 1960's several circuits began to reexamine
their approach to Section 10(b), turning to a duty analysis which ena-
bled courts to avoid the common law requirement of reliance.9 The duty
analysis was better adapted to the spectrum of fraudulent activities
alleged under Rule 10b-5 because it allowed the court to determine on
a case-by-case basis whether the defendant had a duty to the plaintiff
and whether that duty was breached. 0
The Seventh Circuit, in the early 1960's, adopted a theory that negli-
8. Three general requirements of liability have been defined by the courts: (1) misrepre-
sentation or nondisclosure of a material fact; (2) damage to the plaintiff as a result of
reliance, causation or privity; and (3) a closed transaction in which the plaintiff was either
a buyer or seller of securities. BROMBERG, supra note 5, at 194.9.
9. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931); Glanzer v. Shepard,
233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
10. See text accompanying note 16 infra. Since only some circuits reexamined their
approach, the result was substantial conflict in the imposition of liability under 10b-5.
The Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits adopted a form of duty analysis and liberalized
the requirements of liability to include negligence. The Eighth Circuit in Myzel v. Fields,
386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968), held that negligence alone
is sufficient on the basis that the common law concept of fraud was enlarged under 10b-5
to include innocent disclosures. See also Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970). For Ninth Circuit cases holding that common law fraud
need not be proved in a 10b-5 action, see Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d
210 (9th Cir. 1961). For a Seventh Circuit decision holding that negligence will suffice,
see Kohler v. Kohler, Inc., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). See also Comment, Development
of a Flexible Duty Standard of Liability under SEC Rule lOb-5, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
99 (1975).
The Second, Sixth and Tenth Circuits showed little change in their approach to 10b-5
and refused to extend liability to negligent conduct.
In Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951), the court held that
stockholders must show proof of fraud, or intentional conduct, to recover. This decision
has been called the "outer limit" in stringency of the scienter requirement. See Comment,
Scienter and Rule 1Ob-5: Development of a New Standard, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 493, 501
(1974); Isbell, Overview of Accountants' Duties and Liabilities under Federal Securities
Laws and a Closer Look at Whistle-Blowing, 35 OHIo ST. L.J. 261 (1974). The Second
Circuit has slowly modified its position since Fischman. In Securities Exch. Comm'n v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), the
court reduced its requirement from strict intent to defraud to a minimum of "lack of dili-
gence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or negligent conduct." In Shemtob v. Shear-
son, Hammill & Co., 448 F.2d 442, 445 (2d Cir. 1971), the court concluded that an allega-
tion of scienter is required or, in effect, that the allegation must involve more than ordi-
nary negligence. In Leasco Corp. v. Taussig, 473 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1972), the court held
that mere negligence is insufficient and that there must be a showing of falsity or reckless
disregard for truth in making misstatements to support a private right of action. This
position was reaffirmed the following year in Lanza v. Drexel, 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
For the court's most recent decisions, see notes 21-25 infra.
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gence alone could establish liability under Rule 10b-5." In several later
decisions the court broadened the scope of liability. It held that fraud
could be proved by silence and inaction, 2 or constructive fraud,'3 and
that scienter was not a required element of fraud." Finally, the Seventh
Circuit, in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,'5 set forth what it termed a
"flexible standard" of liability. The court defined the elements neces-
sary for making a prima facie case of aiding and abetting under Rule
10b-5:
(1) the defendant had a duty of inquiry
(2) the plaintiff was a beneficiary of that duty of inquiry
(3) the defendant breached the duty of inquiry
(4) concomitant with the breach of duty of inquiry the defendant
breached a duty of disclosure
(5) there is a causal connection between the breach of duty of inquiry
and disclosure and the facilitation of the underlying fraud; that is,
adequate inquiry and subsequent disclosure would have led to the dis-
covery of the underlying fraud or its prevention.'"
11. Kohler v. Kohler, Inc., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963) (court found no breach of duty
on the part of the accountant retained to negotiate sale of stock between the plaintiff and
corporation).
12. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ind. 1968),
aff'd, 417 F.2d. 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (corporation found
to be aider-abettor in fraud by consistently referring customers to a broker before referring
them to the State Securities Commission while the corporation was engaged in a proxy
fight).
13. Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969). Buttrey was followed in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch.,
503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1974), in which the court said, in dictum, that a claim for aiding
and abetting solely by inaction can be maintained by a showing:
[thatl the party charged with aiding and abetting had knowledge of or, but for
a breach of duty of inquiry, should have had knowledge of the fraud, and that
possessing such knowledge the party failed to act due to an improper motive or
breach of duty of disclosure.
Id. at 374.
14. Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc., 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972) (court based its
holding on Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1970) in which the court held
that the plaintiff could recover for negligent misrepresentation).
15. 503 F.2d 1100, 1104 (7th Cir. 1974).
16. Id. at 1104. See also Note, Securities Law-Fraud-Rule lOb-5 Private
Actions-Adoption of a Flexible Duty Standard-White v. Abrams, 16 B.C. IND. & COM.
L. REV. 515 (1975).
Applying this analysis to the facts of Hochfelder, the court found that plaintiffs had
stated a claim of aiding and abetting. 503 F.2d at 1111. The court said the issues to be
decided at trial were:
(1) whether Nay's "mail rule" constituted a material inadequacy in First Securi-
ties' system of internal accounting control; and (2) whether Ernst & Ernst failed
19761
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There was no element of scienter in the Seventh Circuit's, new standard
of liability."7
The Seventh Circuit was not the first to use the "flexible standard"
approach. Earlier in 1974, the Ninth Circuit enunciated its own "flexible
standard" of liability in White v. Abrams." However, its duty analysis
to exercise the due care required of a professional auditor in that it did not
discover a material inadequacy in internal accounting control. An affirmative
finding on both issues will therefore satisfy the third element of plaintiffs' claim
of aiding and abetting, namely a showing of a breach of duty of inquiry.
Id. The court said the professional standards of the accounting industry, the generally
accepted accounting standards of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants,
should be the measure of that duty. Given the liberal holding of the case, this is surprising
since many other courts prior to Hochfelder have not felt compelled to accept the stan-
dards of care established by a professional group. See, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
Nat'l Bank v. Swartz, Bresenoff, Yavner & Jacobs, 455 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972) (Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles held to be minimum standards); United States v. Simon,
425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970) (fulfillment of professional
standards may not be sufficient); Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Kreckstein, Horwath & Horwath,
378 F. Supp. 1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (adherence to Generally Accepted Accounting Princi-
ples will not insulate accountants); Drake v. Thor Power Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94 (N.D.
I1. 1967) (higher standard of responsibility attributable to an accountant with special
expertise). See also Comment, Securities Law Rule lOb-5-Compliance with Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles Will Not Insulate Accountants From Civil Liability for
Fraud, 24 CATH. U. L. REV. 343 (1975).
17. 503 F.2d 1100 (1974).
18. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). The court explained its "flexible standard:"
Without limiting the trial court from making additions or adaptations in a
particular case, we feel the court should, in instructing on a defendant's duty
under rule 10b-5, require the jury to consider the relationship of the defendant
to the plaintiff, the defendant's access to the information as compared to the
plaintiff's access, the benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship,
the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying upon their rela-
tionship in making his investment decisions and the defendant's activity in
initiating the securities transaction in question. . . .The standard we have set
forth here does not impose absolute liability for misrepresentations regardless
of the person's knowledge of falsity. . . .While rejecting scienter and state of
mind ...itself, it requires the court to consider state of mind as [n important
factor in determining the scope of duty that rule 10b-5 imposes.
Id. at 735-36.
Two important Ninth Circuit cases that preceded White are Royal Air Properties, Inc.
v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210 (9th Cir. 1962) and Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961). In
both cases the court held that common law fraud need not be proved.
See Miller & Subak, Impact of Federal Securities Laws: Liabilities of Officers, Directors
and Accountants, 30 Bus. LAW. 387, 394 (1975) in which the authors discuss the impact
of the White holding. They conclude that the Ninth Circuit "transforms that portion of
the rule into an equitable remedy that permits the trier of fact to remedy wrongs in
accordance with the trier's notion of fairness." See also Mann, Rule lOb-5: Evolution of a
Continuum of Conduct to Replace the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1206 (1970).
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still required the court to consider scienter, or state of mind, as an
important factor in that analysis.
The Second Circuit developed a more conservative form of duty anal-
ysis. 9 In Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. , the court
held that some sort of knowledge or culpability must be alleged for a
private action under Rule 10b-5.2' In Cohen v. Franchard,2 the court
stated:
Although it is unnecessary to prove the specific fraudulent intent essen-
tial to state a claim of common law fraud, it must be established that
the defendant was to some extent cognizant of the misstatement or
omission . . . . It is not enough for plaintiff to show that defendant
failed to detect certain material facts when he had no reason to suspect
their existence.
23
In SEC v. Spectrum,24 the Second Circuit made a distinction between
private actions and SEC enforcement actions, holding that negligence
is sufficient in an SEC action but not in a private action for damages.
When the Hochfelder case came before the Supreme Court, these
divergent circuit court views were proposed as precedent. The factual
pattern in Hochfelder presented a perfect opportunity to determine the
issue of scienter. A Chicago securities broker had collected money from
investors and had told the investors that the money was in a special
The Missouri Court of Appeals set forth a four-part test in Aluma Kraft Mfg. Co. v.
Elmer Fox & Co., 493 S.W.2d 378 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973):
(1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2)
the foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of certainty that the plaintiff
suffered injury; and (4) the closeness of the connection between defendant's
conduct and the injury suffered.
Id. at 383. See also Note, Torts-Negligence-Accountants Held Liable t') a Third Party
Not in Privity, 22 KANSAS L. REV. 289 (1974); Comment, Development of a Flexible Duty
Standard of Liability Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 32 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99 (1975).
19. The Second Circuit's standard for liability fell "between an actual showing of an
intent to defraud and a showing of mere negligence." For a comparison of the Ninth and
Second Circuits' positions, see Comment, Scienter and Rule 10b-5: Development of a New
Standard, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 493, 510 (1974).
20. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973). Chris-Craft involved a
contest between two corporations for the control of a third, Piper Aircraft Corp. The
Second Circuit examined congressional policy behind the securities laws and said the laws
were intended to protect the investors who rely on the completeness and accuracy of
information made available to them. Id. at 363.
21. The court stated that "A knowing or reckless failure to discharge ... obligations
constitutes sufficiently culpable conduct to justify a judgment under Rule lOb-5 . . . for
damages .... " Id.
22. 478 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973).
23. Id. at 123.
24. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
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escrow fund. There was, in fact, no escrow fund, and all of the money
had been spent by the broker. This fraud had been concealed for over
twenty years by use of a special mail rule-mail was opened only by the
broker and no one else. Ernst & Ernst, the broker's accountant, was
aware of the mail rule but never questioned its purpose. The issue pre-
sented to the appellate court was whether Ernst & Ernst was liable for
negligent failure to inquire as to the reason for the "mail rule" as part
of its review of internal accounting procedures and controls. 5 The appel-
late court found that negligence in failing to inquire was sufficient,"6 and
Ernst & Ernst sought review. 7 Since the element of intent or scienter9
was not present, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to resolve the
conflict in the circuit courts as to whether scienter is necessary to a
finding of liability or whether negligence alone is sufficient.
The Supreme Court rejected a negligence standard and held that
scienter was required in a private action for damages under Rule 10b-
5. The Court defined "scienter" as a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud. :"' This definition is reminiscent of the
common law definition of scienter, which was "intent to deceive, to
mislead, to convey a false impression,"'" and is in contrast to most
appellate court decisions which had broadened scienter to include ac-
tual knowledge,'2 and in some cases, constructive knowledge. 2
The Court reached its conclusion by analyzing the language of Section
10(b), relating the language of that section to other sections of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, and discussing the relationship of SEC
Rule 10b-5 to Section 10(b) itself. The Court found that the language
of the statute clearly indicated congressional intent, stating:
25. 503 F.2d 1100, 1109 (7th Cir. 1974).
26. Id. at 1111.
27. 421 U.S. 909 (1975).
28. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1512 (4th ed. 1968) defines scienter:
Knowingly .... to signify an allegation . . .setting out the defendant's pre-
vious knowledge of the cause which led to the injury complained of, or rather
his previous knowledge of a state of facts which it was his duty to guard against,
and his omission to do which has led to the injury complained of .... And the
term is frequently used to signify the defendant's guilty knowledge.
By 1975 most courts and commentators had accepted scienter to mean "knowledge,"
either actual or constructive. See note 8 supra.
29. 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1381 (1976).
30. Id. at 1381 n.12.
31. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 715 (4th ed. 1971). See note 8 supra.
32. See notes 8 & 29 supra; note 41 infra.
33. Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969).
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In each instance that Congress created express civil liability in favor
of purchasers or sellers of securities it clearly specified whether recovery
was to be premised on knowing or intentional conduct, negligence, or
entirely innocent mistake. . . . The express recognition of a cause of
action premised on negligent behavior in §11 stands in sharp contrast
to the language of §10(b). . . .,
The procedural limitations set forth in Sections 11, 12(2), and 15, which
expressly allow negligence as a cause of action, were compared to the
lack of such limitations in Section 10(b). Thus, the Court inferred that
Congress did not intend 10(b) to establish a cause of action based on
negligence.15 The SEC, therefore, could not implement a rule based on
10(b) which would change the meaning of the section." To allow the
Commission to alter the congressional intent would be to allow it to
overstep its congressionally-granted authority.37
The Court in Hochfelder made clear, for the second time in less than
a year," that it favors a conservative interpretation of the language and
intent of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. The decision represents a signifi-
cant change from the prior trend of litigation under 10b-5.
In the first decisions concerning 10b-5, the Supreme Court interpreted
the language of the rule liberally. The Court felt that securities legisla-
tion should be construed flexibly rather than technically in order to
effectuate its remedial purpose of avoiding fraud.3 The Hochfelder deci-
sion is in sharp contrast to this prior policy of liberal interpretation."'
34. 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1388 (1976).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 1390. The SEC had argued that subsections (b) and (c) of Rule 10b-5, if read
separately, would seem to imply a negligence standard. Brief for Securities and Exch.
Comm'n at 15, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96 S.Ct. 1375 (1976).
37. The Court stated "The rule making power granted to an administrative agency
charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law." 96
S.Ct. at 1391.
38. Blue Chip Stamps Co. v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), limited the
plaintiff in a 10b-5 action to one who was a buyer or seller of securities. See Note,
Birnbaum: Revisited and Triumphant-Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 25 DE
PAUL L. REV. 132 (1976).
39. See Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Nat'l Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969)
(Court refused to apply a narrow construction to the words "in connection with" and
held that they encompassed an exchange of shares as the result of a proxy solicitation);
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971) (Court interpreted
liberally the "in connection with" phrase to extend 10b-5 protection to corporate as well
as individual sellers); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (Court
held that proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to recovery where there is a failure to
disclose facts that a reasonable investor might have considered important).
40. The Court in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), also
19761
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Certainly the Hochfelder decision, by requiring a more difficult and
absolute standard of proof regardless of the situation, will serve to dis-
courage suits under 10b-5. While unstated, this turnabout reflects a
policy to limit the number of suits brought in the future4' and to alle-
viate somewhat the backlogging on court dockets, which is caused, in
part, by the multitude of cases brought each year under 10b-5.12
The Hochfelder decision effectively dispenses with the entire "flexible
standard" analysis approach. The Supreme Court, in adopting a rigid
standard, has hindered the courts' ability to deal with widely-varying
fact situations on an equitable basis."3 Whether recklessness or gross
negligence would satisfy the Court's scienter requirement was not deter-
mined." The Court did note, however, that in some areas of the law
recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct. 5
Also left unanswered was the question whether the SEC may continue
gave a narrow construction to the language of Rule 10b-5, and held that only a buyer or
seller of securities has standing under the rule.
41. Telephone interview with Willard L. King, attorney for respondents, Chicago, Ill.,
,June 9, 1976. See BNA (1976) TAXATION AND FINANCE (Daily Reporter June 6, 1976).
Justice Stevens, who took no part in the decision, was appointed to the Court after oral
argument. If he had been able to participate, it is likely he would have sided with the
minority. That would not have been enough to change the vote, however. Just prior to
his appointment, Justice Stevens wrote the decision in Sanders v. John Nuveen, 524 F.2d
1064 (7th Cir. 1975), which involved an underwriter who was charged with aiding and
abetting the fraud of a securities issuer. In this parallel case to Hochfelder, Judge Stevens
wrote: the issuer "is under a duty to make at least some investigation directed at the
question whether the ever present possibility of fraud is in fact a reality." Id. at 1071.
Shortly after Hochfelder was decided the Supreme Court vacated Nuveen and re-
manded the case to the appellate court for further consideration in light of Hochfelder.
96 S.Ct. 1375 (1976).
42. Another policy reason for the holding is suggested in a footnote to the decision. 96
S.Ct. 1375, 1391 n.33 (1976). After stating that the negligence standard urged by respon-
dents would have had an "extreme reach," the Court concluded:
The class of persons eligible to benefit from such a standard, though small in
this case, could be numbered in the thousands in other cases. Acceptance of
respondents' view would extend to new frontiers the "hazards" of rendering
expert advice under the Acts . ...
43. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Hochfelder notes that the shareholder who is the
victim of a fraud
. . . can be victimized just as much by negligent conduct as by positive decep-
tion, and. . . it is not logical to drive a wedge between the two, saying Congress
clearly intended the one but certainly not the other.
96 S.Ct. 1375, 1392 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 1381 n.12. Furthermore, the Court denied respondents' request to amend their
complaint to allege gross negligence and thus provide the Court with an opportunity to
settle that question. Id. at 1391.
45. 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1381 n.12 (1976).
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to apply a negligence standard in its own enforcement proceedings."
The SEC argued in its brief that different standards should not be used
in private and public actions.47 Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, agreed
with the SEC, stating:
[Slurely the question whether negligent conduct violates the rule
should not depend upon the plaintiff's identity. If negligence is a viola-
tion factor when the SEC sues, it must be a violation factor when a
private party sues."
Ironically, as a result of the Hochfelder decision, it is likely that the
SEC's use of the negligence standard in its enforcement proceedings
may soon be challenged. The differing standards may be upheld, how-
ever, on the basis of the differing purposes for private and public ac-
tions. The purpose of a private action is to seek money damages for an
alleged wrong, while that of an SEC action is to protect the public by
enjoining violations of the federal securities laws.4" Consequently, it is
arguable that a lesser standard of liability is required in SEC actions
than in private actions."
Hochfelder's holding, of course, is limited to Rule 10b-5 actions. Thus,
shareholders who feel they have been victimized, but cannot meet the
difficult standard of proof set forth in Hochfelder, may turn to the
various states' "blue sky" laws for protection." Many of those laws
accept negligence as a test of legal misconduct.52
There are salutory effects in the Hochfelder decision for both profes-
sionals who serve the securities industry and the stockholding public.
First, the reversal relieves professionals from the fear of liability for
negligence under Rule 10b-5. Therefore, they should be more willing to
provide their clients with services requiring a greater amount of subjec-
tive judgment.53 Second, professionals also may be more willing to ac-
cept the obligation to uncover management fraud.5
46. Id.
47. Brief for Securities and Exch. Comm'n at 16-17, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 96
S.Ct. 1375 (1976).
48. 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1392 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
49. BNA (1976) TAXATION AND FINANCE (Daily Reporter June 6, 1976).
50. Id.
51. Griffin, The Beleaguered Accountants: A Defendant's Viewpoint, 62 A.B.A.J. 759,
763 (1976). Mr. Griffin is chairman of the board of Touche Ross and Company, one of the
Big Eight public accounting firms.
52. Id.
53. Opinion of James Strother, general counsel to Alexander Grant & Co., a public
accounting firm, and former counsel to the AICPA.
54. See Griffin, supra note 51, at 762.
1976]
972 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:962
The Supreme Court reached its decision in Hochfelder by scrutinizing
the language of Section 10(b) to determine congressional intent. In
construing the section's words narrowly to limit liability to intentional
conduct, the Court ignored the basic purpose for the section's exist-
ence-the protection of the public. It also ignored its own admonition
that securities legislation aimed at avoiding fraud should be construed
"not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purpose." 5
Lynn Taylor
55. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); Securities and Exch. Comm'n v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, 376 U.S. 180, 195 (1963).
